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THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
The International Environment 
The International environment has a much more 
positive outlook for Scotland in the first quarter 1994, 
after remaining extremely uncertain over the past 
couple of years. The UK, US and Canadian recessions 
had pushed annualized G7 growth down to 0.8% in 
1992, but this improved to 1.8% in 1993 as the US 
and Canada began the long road to a sustained 
recovery. With the recession in the European Union 
and the unending saga of Japanese attempts to revive 
demand, G7 growth subsided in 1993 to 1.2%. The 
OECD has estimated that the economy of the 
European Union contracted by 0.3% in 1993 and 
Figures 1 & 2 show the extent of this contraction in 
Europe, comparing it with the rest of the G7. 
Inflationary pressures have receded in most 
industrialised countries, except for a small risk in the 
USA. More accurately, the risk to countries is not 
from inflation but, especially in the case of Japan, 
from deflation. Labour markets in all of the 
industrialised nations are suffering from a high level 
of slack or overmanning. European unemployment 
rose to an average level of 9.5% in 1992 and is 
expected to have risen to around 11.0% by the end of 
1993 as Spanish unemployment rocketed to 24% of 
the labour force. 
The United States of America 
In the United States, the economy has benefitted from 
nearly five years without a major hike in interest 
rates. Since late 1991 real interest rates have 
effectively been at zero or below. Gross Domestic 
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Product rose effortlessly after the Democrat victory in 
the 1992 elections but faltered in the first quarter 
1993 as consumers recoiled from the threat of tax 
rises. Since then growth has accelerated and reached 
7.5% year-on-year in the last quarter 1993. 
One feature of this recovery phase, as we have 
regularly highlighted, is the near absence of strong 
employment growth. And fears of a jobless recovery 
have been heightened by the new method of 
calculating the rate of unemployment whose 
introduction will raise the rate by about 0.7% points 
to around 7.5%. In defence, Laura Tyson - the US 
trade secretary - has insisted that strong output growth 
accompanied by a healthy productivity trend could 
still help to provide new jobs in the USA1. 
Despite low inflationary pressures, financial markets 
have become increasingly worried about its 
resurgence. So, in early February, Mr Alan Greenspan 
ordered the raising of the Federal Funds rate by one 
quarter of one percent. It was hoped that this would 
achieve two ends, one, to reduce the likelihood of a 
rise in inflationary expectations since monetary policy 
has been very loose since late 1991, and two, to 
stimulate investment growth which has been, and still 
is, the foundation of recovery. At the time of going to 
press it would seem as if the markets have taken the 
historical - negative - view that a rise in short term 
interest rates is a signal of incipient inflation and not -
as was intended and advised in this case - an attempt 
to signal the Fed's determination not to accommodate 
any increase in inflationary expectations. Gilt prices 
have been falling since the announcement and yields 
on long dated stock have risen above 6.5% for the 
first time in many quarters. This might not be a huge 
problem since the estimated increase in investment 
over 1993 was 10%. Confidence appears to be high 
and the recovery seems well established. 
President Clinton's new measures to reduce the 
budget deficit have been received with a heavy dose 
of cynicism. Were the projections for fiscal 
retrenchment to be fulfilled the result would be a 
deficit below $100bn. But high income tax rises -
which Republicans warn will stimulate not higher 
revenue but higher avoidance and creative 
accountancy - and the seemingly implausible 
assumptions on curbing defence spending only 9% 
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over the next three fiscal years (over the last three 
years spending on the military has risen by 45%) 
may yet produce a rise in the budget. 
Japan 
Japan is still floating without a rudder, or some would 
say a plan. Previous attempts to get things moving by 
fiscal injection foundered and heightened the tension 
between Japan and the United States caused by the 
Trade Surplus. The Protectionist voices from 
Washington were not satisfied that the Japanese 
authorities were trying hard enough to revive demand 
and the two countries' leaders met in Washington to 
discuss possible means by which the huge surplus can 
be reduced. The US wanted a numerical reduction but 
the Japanese were insisting that, not only was the 
treat of protection against the ethos of the Uruguay 
settlement, they were trying hard to open up their 
domestic market to greater competition from abroad. 
Nothing was agreed and uncorroborated roomers of a 
US plot to talk up the Yen led to a further 
appreciation. Why the USA would do this given that 
a stronger Yen would probably keep Japan in 
recession for even longer is counter-intuitive. After 
all, the corporate and household sectors have suffered 
extremely badly from their over indulgences in the 
late 1980s and further lashings from the USA would 
not be very clever. 
At the time of going to press the continuance of 
deflationary pressure is only too apparent. With 
consumer price inflation currently running at 1% and 
producer prices a shade under 3% there is still some 
way to go before real balances are high enough to 
stimulate spending and restart the economy. Recently, 
manufacturers have stopped running down their levels 
of stocks, an indication that there is little chance of 
recovery soon and the level of business investment 
has fallen. Business and Consumer confidence are 
very weak, the latter at an historical low point. 
The Japanese labour market is also an important - if 
relatively invisible - indicator of how badly the 
economic downswing has affected the decision 
making process. The historically low levels of 
unemployment in Japan (1-2.5% of the labour force) 
have been endlessly cited as proof that their's is the 
superior mode of production. But closer inspection of 
trends in 1992 and 1993 shows that all is not well. In 
one instance there has been an partial abandonment of 
the Job-for-Life ethic and a consequent rise in the 
number of workers taking early retirement. Also, the 
levels of overtime and recruitment have begun to 
decline as the full force of a near slump takes hold. 
Count this along with a huge discouraged worker 
effect and surplus manning of around an estimated 
750,000 workers and the casual observer quickly 
comes to the conclusion that an official rate of 
unemployment of 2.8% is probably an under-estimate 
of between 4-7%. A recent report in The Economist 
magazine has indicated that, once adjustments for 
labour hoarding are accounted for the effective, rate 
of unemployment in Japan is probably equal or even 
higher than in the USA. 
The response to the no growth syndrome has not been 
through interest rates, as would have been the case in 
'Western' economies. The policy weapon has been 
fiscal policy2 and in February the government 
announced a Y15,250bn spending and tax cut plan -
which is to be financed by bond sales rather than 
indirect tax rises. With a hint of deja vu we feel that 
this will finally pull the Japanese economy out of 
recession provided the Yen is not allowed to go too 
near to Y100 to the dollar - where many Japanese 
manufacturers would be making a clear loss. The 
previous two supplementary budgets failed to 
stimulate activity because the authorities were bound 
to match increased spending with an increase in 
taxation. But this time around, things are different and 
the issuance of government debt - for the first time in 
five years - should get things moving since long rates 
are unlikely to rise given the fiscal surplus brought 
about by many years of financial prudency. Had the 
Japanese gone on a wild tax cutting spree in the 
1980s even this option would not have been available. 
Reliance on monetary policy and a subsequently even 
higher trade surplus would have been the probable 
result. 
Western Europe 
In Western Europe conditions are easing as the 
Bundesbank has continued cut lending rates. 
Inflation continues to subside. This has had the effect 
of returning the former narrowly banded currencies of 
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the ERM to within 2.25% of the Deutschmark. The 
cuts in German rates have also allowed yields on pan-
European government bonds to fall at the long end 
and improve the potential for an upward revision to 
investment intentions in the near future - an important 
policy objective given that most investment in the 
Federal Republic is long-term. 
The effects of the German recession - which seems to 
have ended around the middle of the third quarter 
1993 - had been mitigated to some extent by the 
buoyancy of net exports. But now, in the first quarter 
1994, there is the likelihood that we will see a pick 
up in domestic demand and further falls in interest 
rates cumulating to around 1-1.5% percentages points 
over 1994. This would leave German short real 
interest rates at 2% by the end of the year. 
The European labour market, for many years the 
object of lament, is now estimated by the OECD to 
have 17million unemployed workers, over half the 
30million unemployed in the OECD. In response the 
European Commission produced a white paper 
entitled Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in 
an attempt to stimulate debate on how wage/non-wage 
costs could be reduced and jobs created. As we know, 
the blame for the very high level of unemployment in 
the Union is directed - primarily by the UK 
government - at excessive regulation and relatively 
higher hiring and firing costs than those found in the 
USA. In popular economics jargon this excessive 
bureaucracy is known as Eurosclerosis. 
The European Commission's white paper proposes a 
micro-macro approach. On the micro side, the 
emphasis is placed on enhancing the employer's 
ability to respond quickly to an upturn in demand by 
increasing employment. The paper is sympathetic to 
the economically right-of-centre view that the state 
must roll back those barriers which impede employers 
from employing workers with lower productivity 
levels. This, obviously, means the abandonment of 
minimum wage legislation and further legislative 
curbs on union activity. On the macro side the paper 
also recognises that there is a need for co-operation 
between governments, employers and unions - along 
the lines which have successfully been employed in 
Ireland - to hold down wages and channel investment 
into training and R&D so that in the future companies 
from Europe can compete with their Asian 
counterparts who still maintain a cost advantage. As 
the Asian economies mature, and form unions to 
protect workers from low wage exploitation, a 
successful move to cooperate on training and 
investment policy by me European nations will put 
them in a good position to compete effectively in the 
next century3. 
Whether this will be successful we will have to wait 
and see. If the white paper is implemented and the 
reforms are effective then we should see employment 
growth along side a steady rate of inflation, rather 
than the contemporary phenomenon of choosing lower 
inflation for high unemployment and wastage of 
resources. But, it should be remembered that in the 
USA greater flexibility has brought with it greater 
social problems and a wider disparity in earnings 
since the last century. Therefore some compromise 
must be found between moving from high 
unemployment to high levels of social 
disenfranchisement. 
The United Kingdom 
The continuing recovery is less rapid and more 
uncertain than in the immediate aftermath of previous 
recessions. During the quarter 1993, 'real' GDP rose 
by 0.8% to a level 2.6% higher than a year earlier and 
this left the year-on-year increase at 2%. But caution 
is recommended. While the recovery has now been 
under-way for seven quarters, GDP in the fourth 
quarter still stood 0.5% below the last cyclical peak 
in me second quarter 1990. 
Both production and service sectors are expanding. 
Growm in the former outpaced the service sector 
growth in the final quarter of last year. But, the 
recovery has been more evident in the service sector 
and by the fourth quarter, service sector output stood 
1% above the previous cyclical peak. Production 
output was more than 1.7% below die previous peak. 
The relative buoyancy of service sector output in part 
reflects the strength of consumers' expenditure in the 
upturn. The relative weakness of Production has, 
moreover, served to subdue the growth of overall 
domestic demand. Had it not been for a resurgence in 
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demand for UK exports the recovery would have been 
even slower and more narrowly based. 
Consumers's expenditure rose by over 3 percent in 
the year to the fourth quarter. Retail sales continued 
their improvement into January of this year having 
risen for six consecutive months. The savings ratio 
fell throughout 1993 - net wealth rose despite a flat 
housing market as equity prices increased sharply -
and the demand for consumer credit picked up 
considerably. In addition, the unexpected falls in 
recorded unemployment will also have served to 
reduce the need for high levels of saving and 
increased the willingness to take on new debt. 
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Corporate expenditures were relatively flat during 
1993. Manufacturing investment exhibited no real 
growth, and there were significant contractions in 
distribution and business services. But, recent survey 
evidence suggests that manufacturers are anticipating 
increases in investment in plant and machinery in 
early 1994 and we would expect such intentions to 
harden considerably during the year. De-stocking, 
which has been largely concentrated in manufacturing, 
also appears to be coming to an end. Throughout the 
year, stock levels should gradually rise and make a 
contribution to overall growth. 
Net Trade is contributing positively to growth. The 
deficit on visible trade fell during 1993 compared 
with 1992, although on a trend basis the deficit 
appears to have been flattening in recent months. 
Nevertheless, the deficit in 1993 is likely to be around 
£2 billion below the deficit in 1992, reflecting 
improvements in Britain's competitiveness with the 
rest of the EC. As reported in previous issues of the 
Commentary, intra-EC trade data remain problematic 
and the new system of data collection appears to be 
under recording European trade flows. Britain's trade 
outside the EC has risen since sterling's exit from the 
ERM although the volume of exports and imports 
has broadly risen pari passus. Both the visible 
balance and the current balance are likely to 
deteriorate during 1994 with rising domestic demand 
attracting more imports as, in particular, investment 
picks up and stockbuilding occurs, and as some 
domestic production is switched from exports to home 
use. 
Inflation was more subdued in 1993 than had been 
predicted at the beginning of the year. In the fourth 
quarter, the underlying annual rate was 2.7% 
compared with forecasts of between 3% and 5%. Low 
world inflation, affecting commodity and raw material 
prices, a stronger pound sterling than expected and 
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the low level of pay and earnings increases are the 
principal reasons why forecasters were confounded. 
Earnings, Costs and Productivity 
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The rate of growth of average earnings appears to 
have stabilised at 3% in the final quarter 1993, after 
over three years of almost continuous decline. 
However, wage inflation in manufacturing remains 
almost 2% higher than in services. The rate of 
growth of labour productivity, which peaked in the 
first quarter 1993, continues to fall - both in the 
whole economy and in manufacturing. The result is 
that manufacturing unit labour costs, which declined 
throughout 1992 and to the second quarter 1993, have 
started to rise again. Whole economy unit labour costs 
are also increasing, though it must be stressed only at 
a relatively moderate rate. 
During 1994, however, we should expect to see a rise 
in the underlying rate for three reasons. One, the 1993 
reductions in mortgage interest payments and the 
effects of the move from the Poll Tax to the Council 
tax will drop out of the calculations. Secondly, 1993 
saw various budget measures which are inflationary -
the introduction of VAT on fuel and the increases in 
excise duties. Thirdly, other factors will appear such 
as the delayed effects of Sterling's exit from the 
ERM, increasing unit wage costs and a restoration of 
retailing margins following the recent bout of price 
wars in the high street. All three will increase the 
annual rate of underlying inflation. Nevertheless, the 
rate should remain within the Government's 4% 
ceiling during 1994, although the final outcome will 
be dependent on moderation in wage and salary 
demands during the coming pay rounds, something 
which can by no means be guaranteed. 
UK unemployment peaked in January 1993, but the 
subsequent recovery in the labour market has been 
rather fitful. Although unemployment fell consistently 
in the last quarter of 1993, in January 1994 there was 
a small increase in both the male and female counts 
and an accompanying decline in the number of job 
vacancies. The rather weak improvement in the 
unemployment position is also reflected in the total 
employment figures which show that whilst UK 
employment rose in the second and third quarters of 
1993, it was still at a lower level than at the same 
time in the previous year. Employment continues to 
fall in manufacturing, although the third quarter 1993 
showed a reasonably large increase in service 
employment. 
World Trade 
The Uruguay Round of Trade talks has finally been 
concluded. The longest round of trade talks in Gatt's 
history - not least because of its ambitious agenda -
holds out the prospect of increasing world trade over 
the next 10 years by between USS213bn and 
US$274bn. These estimates are somewhat on the 
cautious side since they do not incorporate likely 
benefits from increased trade in services, 
strengthened trading rules and regulations, and a 
more competitive and integrated global economy. 
The European Union - the world's largest exporter -
not surprisingly will be one of the principal 
beneficiaries of this accord. Greater market access 
for its goods and services will further boost its 
already formidable export levels. 
Scottish exporters will also benefit from this enhanced 
market access for their commodities. In particular 
the textile industry will reap substantial benefits 
from the gradual phasing out (over the next 13 
years) of quotas and tariffs under the multi-fibre 
agreement which should be abandoned altogether by 
2005. (Some tariffs on textiles will remain, though at 
substantially reduced levels in some markets). Most 
of the gains from the abandonment of the multi-fibre 
agreement will be reaped by exporters in the 
developing countries, particularly China (which is 
still not formerly a Gatt member) and other Asian 
countries. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 5 Volume 19, No. 3, 1994 
The removal of tariffs altogether in the G7 
countries, and their reduction in other Gatt countries 
should lift the spirits of the Scotch whisky industry. 
The industry's exports is expected to rise as result of 
these tariff removal/reductions, but may still be 
inhibited in some overseas markets by non-tariff 
restrictions. 
Scottish farmers, on the other hand, may find their 
farm incomes falling in the short-term ; but this 
short-term income decline should be credited more to 
CAP reform than the farm trade settlement of the Gatt 
accord. In the long -run, increased productivity and 
output may allow farmers to reap the benefits of 
the Gatt agreement and compensate them for the 
reductions in their artificially high support prices. 
Commodity Prices 
The overall level of commodity prices has remained 
fairly stable in the recent past because of two 
counteracting effects. Oil production has been 
overdone and the Brent price recently fell below 
$14pb. Conversely, the price of non-agricultural 
commodities, particularly timber, rose by over 12% in 
the fourth quarter - reflecting conditions in die United 
States. 
Over the fourth quarter 1994 food prices only rose by 
4.1% and metals prices fell by over 6%. Prices should 
be stable in the near future as new production 
techniques are less commodity and energy intensive 
and the price of food is unlikely to rise in line with 
incomes. 
The International Outlook 
Now that 1992 and 1993 are over, the generally 
accepted forecast is one in which inflation remains 
low - die result of die successful conclusion to the 
Uruguay Round and the impending rise in oil 
production - and unemployment settles down at a 
higher level, given steady inflation, than at the end of 
me 1980s. The United States is making concerted 
efforts to tackle its deficit problem and the countries 
of the European Union are coming out of recession. 
The outlook for die coming months, and for 1994, is 
one of lower interest rates and inflation in all 
countries except the USA where its is becoming 
increasingly likely diat the FED will move to increase 
interest rates again. The next rise, given die increasing 
frequency of data showing resurgent inflation, will 
probably be in the region of one half to three quarters 
of one percent since the original seems to have come 
too late and in too small a package. The result has 
been market chaos tiiroughout early March and bond 
traders have moved out of US bonds by the drove. 
The unfortunate result has been a rise in long yields 
and a probable slowdown in capital investment. An 
upward movement widiin the next quarter will bring 
witii it a depreciation of the pound-dollar exchange 
rate and a boost to Scodand's export companies, in 
particular office machinery, chemicals and textiles. 
Whisky manufacturers will benefit from higher profits 
since their products are invoiced in dollars and die 
depreciation will raise die dollar price of tiieir 
products. 
Since most of Scotland's trade goes to Western 
Europe, what should we be expecting? Exporters 
should not be particularly worried by the 20% rise in 
M3 in January - it is unlikely to push up interest rates 
and send die EU economy back into recession. The 
explosion was a statistical abberation, caused by 
special factors, and we should see a continuance of 
the downward trend in die repo rate for the rest of 
tiiis year. This will stimulate die demand for imports 
in Scodand's two biggest markets - France and 
Germany - and improve Scottish growdi in 1994. This 
will be a very important event for Scotland given tiiat 
it is 24% more dependent on exports than die United 
Kingdom economy. 
The UK outlook 
Growdi will continue to improve during 1994. Year-
on-year growtii in 1994 is expected to be around 
2.5%, which is the "average" of die Treasury's 
January survey of 35 independent forecasters. These 
forecasts are confined to a fairly narrow range of 
1.5% to just above 3%. 
Growdi will be boosted in 1994 as corporate 
expenditures rise. Company spending on investment 
and stocks will increase. Recent evidence from me 
CBI Industrial Trends Survey suggests that capacity 
utilisation is now above its long-term trend. This in 
part represents die scrapping of excess capacity as 
well as die outcome of faster output growdi. In 
addition, die lagged effect of relaxation of monetary 
policy since 1992, combined witii lower dian 
anticipated inflation, is reducing die cost of capital. 
For tiiese reasons, coupled witii improved corporate 
profit performance last year which allowed a 
restructuring of corporate balance sheets and a 
lowering of debt-equity ratios, we expect a 
considerable boost to investment diroughout 1994. 
Reduced user-capital costs and improved liquidity will 
also make it easier for companies to rebuild tiieir 
stock-output ratios which, given expectations of 
further demand growtii, should see an end to 
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de-stocking and an accumulation of stocks. However, 
given improved stock-control techniques and the 
introduction of 'just-in-time' production systems, the 
stock-output ratio is unlikely to be rebuilt to the levels 
attained in the recovery from earlier recessions and so 
the contribution of stockbuilding to growth will be 
relatively smaller. 
The outcome for consumption during 1994 might, at 
first sight, appear to be more problematic in view of 
the fiscal tightening introduced in the 1993 Budgets. 
The February Report from the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (NIESR) indicates that 
as a result of die measures, the Government's net 
revenue has been increased by £12.8 billion in 1994 
and by considerably higher sums in 1995 and 1996. 
This fiscal tightening is estimated to amount to 1.9% 
of GDP in 1994/5, 2.4% of GDP in 1995/6 and 2.8% 
of GDP in 1996/7, and can be compared with the 
tightening introduced in the infamous 1981 Budget of 
1.4%. As the NIESR point out, the prospective impact 
on personal sector spending of these changes will 
depend on the extent to which consumers allow future 
tax and expenditure changes to affect current 
spending plans. 
In simulations where spending is allowed to be 
influenced both by the past alone and by future 
expectations, die NIESR find tiiat the overall negative 
effect on consumption and GDP is about the same but 
witii forward looking behaviour the negative impact 
is more substantial in earlier years. So, they estimate 
that, in comparison with what otherwise would have 
occurred, consumption will be 1% lower (GDP -0.5%) 
in 1994 with forward looking behaviour, compared 
widi a drop of 0.5% (GDP -0.,3%) where expectations 
are assumed to be solely backward-looking. These 
estimates assume mat me Budget changes have no 
effect on interest rates and exchange rates, which 
becomes less tenable in the longer term. Given that 
me impact on consumption of the earlier relaxation of 
monetary policy has still to fully feed through to 
consumption and into view of the subsequent 
lowering of base rate in two stages to 5.25 %, which 
became possible as result of fiscal tightening, the 
effect of the Budget changes are likely to have only 
a small negative effect on consumption during the 
current year. 
The same can not be said for 1995 and 1996, 
although it is to be hoped that rising consumer 
confidence, an increased potential for equity 
withdrawal as the housing market picks up and a 
strong equities market will ensure that the growth of 
consumers' expenditure continues. But consumer 
spending and growth will be appreciably lower in 
1995 to 1998 because of the Budget measures; unless 
interest rates or the exchange fall further than 
presently anticipated. Indeed, we are more likely to 
see interest rates taking an upward rather than a 
downward path as the World and UK economies 
expand and as inflationary expectations increase. 
Notes: 
2. 
See - The Financial Times, February 16th 
1994 
As the OECD have recently pointed out, the 
Japanese economy is the only G7 country in 
a position to reflate using fiscal policy. The 
cyclically adjusted deficit is in surplus in 
Japan, compared with a very large numerical 
deficit in the USA and a European wide 
failure to meet the Maastrict budgetary 
requirement of a 3% of GDP deficit. 
See the OECD Economic Outlook -
December 1993 
See - Head to Head 
publishing 
Lester Thurow, Nb 
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Table 1 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993(f) 
Real GDP growth (% year on year) 
USA 
% 
3.2 
2.9 
3.1 
3.9 
2.5 
1.2 
-0.7 
2.6 
2.8 
Japan 
% 
5.0 
2.6 
4.1 
6.2 
4.7 
4.8 
4.0 
1.3 
-0.5 
Germany 
% 
2.0 
2.3 
1.5 
3.7 
3.6 
5.7 
4.5 
2.1 
-1.5 
France 
% 
1.9 
2.5 
2.3 
4.5 
4.3 
2.5 
0.7 
1.4 
-0.9 
UK 
% 
3.8 
4.1 
4.8 
4.4 
2.1 
0.5 
-2.2 
-0.6 
2.0 
EU 
% 
2.5 
2.8 • 
2.9 
4.1 
3.5 
3.1 
1.5 
1.1 
-0.3 
G7 
% 
3.3 
2.9 
3.2 
4.5 
3.2 
2.4 
0.8 
1.8 
1.2 
Source: OECD 
Table 2 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993(f) 
Private 
USA 
% 
3.9 
3.1 
4.2 
4.2 
4.9 
5.1 
4.3 
3.3 
2.7 
consumption 
Japan 
% 
2.2 
0.4 
0.2 
-0.1 
1.8 
2.6 
2.5 
2.0 
0.9 
deflators (% 
Germany 
% 
1.8 
-0.6 
0.5 
1.3 
2.9 
2.7 
2.7 
4.7 
4.1 
year on year) 
France 
% 
5.7 
2.7 
3.2 
2.6 
3.4 
2.9 
3.0 
2.4 
2.3 
UK 
% 
5.3 
4.3 
4.3 
5.1 
5.9 
5.3 
7.1 
5.0 
3.5 
EU 
% 
5.7 
3.8 
3.5 
3.7 
4.8 
4.5 
5.2 
4.6 
3.8 
G7 
% 
4.0 
2.6 
3.1 
3.2 
4.2 
4.3 
4.2 
3.4 
2.6 
Source: OECD 
Table 3 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993(f) 
Unemployment rates (national definitions) 
USA 
% 
7.2 
7.0 
6.2 
5.5 
5.3 
5.5 
6.7 
7.4 
6.9 
Japan 
% 
2.6 
2.8 
2.9 
2.5 
2.3 
2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.5 
Germany 
% 
8.0 
7.7 
7.6 
7.6 
6.9 
6.0 
6.7 
7.7 
8.9 
France 
% 
10.3 
10.4 
10.5 
10.0 
9.4 
8.9 
9.5 
10.4 
11.7 
UK 
% 
11.6 
11.6 
10.3 
8.2 
6.2 
5.9 
8.3 
10.0 
10.3 
EU 
% 
11.1 
11.2 
10.9 
10.3 
9.3 
8.7 
9.2 
10.3 
11.3 
G7 
% 
7.4 
7.4 
7.0 
6.3 
5.8 
5.7 
6.6 
7.3 
7.3 
Source: OECD 
Table 4 UK demand and output (1990 prices) 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1992:4 
1993:1 
1993:2 
1993:3 
1993:4 
GDP 
% (average) 
4.0 
4.6 
5.0 
2.2 
0.6 
-2.3 
-0.5 
2.0 
1.3 
1.9 
2.0 
2.5 
Consumers' 
expenditure % 
6.8 
5.3 
7.5 
3.2 
0.6 
-2.2 
-0.1 
2.5 
2.1 
2.0 
2.7 
3.2 
Investment 
GDFCF % 
2.4 
10.2 
13.5 
5.5 
-3.4 
-9.8 
-1.6 
0.4 
0.9 
-0.7 
1.5 
-0.3 
Govern 
consump 
1.6 
1.0 
0.7 
1.4 
2.5 
2.5 
0.7 
-0. 
-1. 
-1. 
0.8 
0.8 
Source: CSO 
Table 5 Money and prices (1990 prices) 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1992:4 
1993:1 
1993:2 
1993:3 
1993:4 
MO % 
4.5 
4.2 
4.5 
7.3 
5.4 
5.0 
2.5 
2.2 
5.1 
4.7 
4.5 
5.3 
5.8 
RPIX 
3.0 
3.0 
3.4 
4.1 
5.3 
7.0 
7.7 
4.6 
3.0 
2.8 
3.0 
3.4 
2.8 
Average 
earnings - whole 
economy 
% 
8.3 
7.0 
7.7 
8.7 
9.1 
9.8 
8.0 
6.1 
3.5 
4.3 
3.7 
3.1 
3.1 
Average 
earnings 
manufacturing 
% 
9.0 
7.8 
7.9 
8.5 
8.7 
9.4 
8.2 
6.6 
4.7 
5.1 
4.8 
3.6 
4.0 
Unit wage costs 
whole economy 
% 
5.3 
4.5 
4.4 
6.8 
9.5 
9.9 
7.0 
4.2 
0.0 (q2) 
2.8 
0.3 
0.0 
1.1 
Unit wage cos 
manufacturin 
% 
5.7 
4.0 
2.4 
2.6 
4.3 
7.3 
6.9 
1.6 
-1.9 
-2.7 
-1.8 
-0.5 
0.8 
Source: Financial Times, Department of Employment 
Table 6 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1992:4 
1993:1 
1993:2 
1993:3 
1993:4 
Activity, employment and unemployment (1990 prices) 
Industrial 
production 
% (1990 prices) 
-
2.5 
4.0 
4.8 
2.1 
-0.3 
3.9 
-0.5 
2.8 
1.8 
3.0 
2.8 
3.5 
Manufacturing 
output 
% (1990 prices) 
-
1.3 
-6.4 
6.7 
4.8 
-0.2 
-5.3 
-0.8 
2.0 
1.9 
2.1 
1.7 
2.3 
Employment 
GB (Sa) 
000s 
20,910 
20,876 
21,081 
21,748 
22,143 
22,373 
21,707 
21,296 
20,790 
20,823 
20,791 
20,790 
20,888 
Employment 
manufacturing 
GB (Sa) 000s 
5,269 
5,138 
5,068 
5,109 
5,101 
5,018 
4,623 
4,419 
4,212 
4,190 
4,201 
4,212 
4,185 
Unemploy 
UK (S 
000s 
3,027 
3,097 
2,806 
2,274 
1,784 
1,662 
2,287 
2,766 
2,993 
2,967 
2,922 
2,914 
2,801 
Source: Department of Employment, CSO 
